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Fluoride and the Phosphate Connection PDF Print E-mail

Fluoride and the Phosphate Connection

by George C. Glasser



Cities all over the US purchase hundreds of thousands of gallons of fresh pollution concentrate from Florida - fluorosilicic acid (H2SiF6) - to fluoridate water.

Fluorosilicic acid is composed of tetrafluorosiliciate gas and other species of fluorine gases captured in pollution scrubbers and concentrated into a 23% solution during wet process phosphate fertilizer manufacture. Generally, the acid is stored in outdoor cooling ponds before being shipped to US cities to artificially fluoridate drinking water.

Fluoridating drinking water with recovered pollution is a cost-effective means of disposing of toxic waste. The fluorosilicic acid would otherwise be classified as a hazardous toxic waste on the Superfund Priorities List of toxic substances that pose the most significant risk to human health and the greatest potential liability for manufacturers.

Phosphate fertilizer suppliers have more than $10 billion invested in production and mining facilities in Florida. Phosphate fertilizer production accounts for $800 million in wages per year. Florida's mines produce 30% of the world supply and 75% of the US supply of phosphate fertilizers. Much of the country's supply of fluoro-silicic acid for water fluoridation is also produced in Florida.

Reverse Osmosis Removes Arsenic, Fluoride, Lead, Sodium,  Nitrates--virtually anything you could want removed from water.

Check it out.



Phosphate fertilizer manufacturing and mining are not environment friendly operations. Fluorides and radionuclides are the primary toxic pollutants from the manufacture of phosphate fertilizer in Central Florida. People living near the fertilizer plants and mines, experience lung cancer and leukemia rates that are double the state average. Much of West Central Florida has become a toxic waste dump for phosphate fertilizer manufacturers. Federal and state pollution regulations have been modified to accommodate phosphate fertilizer production and use: These regulations have included using recovered pollution for water fluoridation.

Radium wastes from filtration systems at phosphate fertilizer facilities are among the most radioactive types of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) wastes. The radium wastes are so concentrated, they cannot be disposed of at the one US landfill licensed to accept NORM wastes, so manufacturers dump the radioactive wastes in acidic ponds atop 200-foot-high gypsum stacks. The federal government has no rules for its disposal.

During the late 1960s, fluorine emissions were damaging crops, killing fish and causing crippling skeletal fluorosis in livestock. The EPA became concerned and enforced regulations requiring manufacturers to install pollution scrubbers. At that time, the facilities were dumping the concentrated pollution directly into waterways leading into Tampa Bay.

A Phosphate Worse than Death

In the late 1960s, EPA chemist Ervin Bellack worked out the ideal solution to a monumental pollution problem. Because recovered phosphate fertilizer manufacturing waste contain about 19% fluorine, Bellack concluded that the concentrated "scrubber liquor" could be a perfect water fluoridation agent. It was a liquid and easily soluble in water, unlike sodium fluoride - a waste product from aluminum manufacturing. It was also inexpensive.

Fate also intervened. The aluminum industry, which previously supplied sodium fluoride for water fluoridation, was facing a shortage of fluorspar used in smelting aluminum. Consequently, there was a shortage of sodium fluoride to fluoridate drinking water.

For the phosphate fertilizer industry, the shortage of sodium fluoride was the key to turning red ink into black and an environmental liability into a perceived asset. With the help of the EPA, fluorosilicic acid was transformed from a concentrated toxic waste and a liability into a "proven cavity fighter."

The EPA and the US Public Health Service waived all testing procedures and - with the help of the American Dental Association (ADA) - encouraged cities to add the radioactive concentrate into America's drinking water as an "improved" form of fluoride.

The product is not "fluorine" or "fluoride" as proponents state: It is a pollution concentrate. Fluorine is only one captured pollutant comprising about 19% of the total product.

By 1983, the official EPA policy was expressed by EPA Office of Water Deputy Administrator Rebecca Hanmer as follows: "In regard to the use of fluosilicic (fluorosilicic) acid as a source of fluoride for fluoridation, this agency regards such use as an ideal environmental solution to a long-standing problem. By recovering by-product fluosilicic acid from fertilizer manufacturing, water and air pollution are minimized, and water utilities have a low-cost source of fluoride available to them."

A Hot New Property
In promoting the use of the pollution concentrate as a fluoridation agent, the ADA, Federal agencies and manufacturers failed to mention that it was radioactive. Whenever uranium is found in nature as a component of a mineral, a host of other radionuclides are always found in the mineral in various stages of decay. Uranium and all of its decay-rate products are found in phosphate rock, fluorosilicic acid and phosphate fertilizer.

During wet-process manufacturing, trace amounts of radium and uranium are captured in the pollution scrubber. This process was the subject of an article by H.F. Denzinger, H. J. König and G.E. Krüger in the fertilizer industry journal, Phosphorus & Potassium (No. 103, Sept./Oct. 1979) discussed how radionuclides are carried into the fluorosilicic acid.

While the uranium and radium in fluorosilicic acid are known carcinogens, two decay products of uranium are even more carcinogenic: radon-222 and polonium-210.

During the acidulation process that creates phosphoric acid, radon gas contained in the phosphate pebble can be released in greater proportions than other decay-rate products (radionuclides) and carried over into the fluorosilicic acid. Polonium may also be captured in greater quantities during scrubbing operations because, like radon, it can readily combine with fluoride.

In written communications to the author, EPA Office of Drinking Water official Joseph A. Cotruvo and Public Health Service fluoridation engineer Thomas Reeves have acknowledged the presence of radionuclides in fluorosilicic acid.

Radon-222 is not an immediate threat because it stops emitting alpha radiation and decays into lead-214 in 3.86 days. Lead-214 appears to be harmless but it eventually decays into bismuth-214 and then into polonium-214. Unless someone knew to look for specific isotopes, no one would know that a transmutation into the polonium isotope had occurred.

Polonium-210, a decay product of bismuth-210, has a half-life of 138 days and gives off intense alpha radiation as it decays into regular lead and becomes stable. Any polonium-210 that might be present in the phosphate concentrate could pose a significant health threat. A very small amount of polonium-210 can be very dangerous, giving off 5,000 times more alpha radiation than the same amount of radium. As little as 0.03 microcuries (6.8 trillionths of a gram) of polonium-210 can be carcinogenic to humans.

The lead isotope behaves like calcium in the body. It may be stored in the bones for years before turning into polonium-210 and triggering a carcinogenic release of alpha radiation.

Drinking water fluoridated with fluorosilicic acid contains radon at every sequence of its decay to polonium. The fresher the pollution concentrate, the more polonium it will contain.

As long as the amount of contaminants added to the drinking water (including radionuclides in fluorosilicic acid) do not exceed the limits set forth in the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA has no regulatory problem with the use of any contaminated products for drinking water treatment.

Big Risks: No Tests

Despite the increased cancer risk from using phosphate waste to fluoridate drinking water, the EPA nor the Centers for Disease Control have never commissioned or required any clinical studies with the pollution concentrate - specifically, the hexafluorsilicate radical whose toxicokinetic properties are different than the lone, fluoride ion.

Section 104 (I) (5) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) directs the Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the EPA, the Public Health Service and the National Toxicology Program to initiate a program of research on fluoride safety. However, after almost 30 years of using fluorosilicic acid and sodium fluorosilicate to fluoridate the drinking water, not one study has been commissioned.

The fluoride ion only hypothetically exists as an entity in an ideal solution of purified water - and tap water is far from pure H2O. All clinical research with animal models is done using 99.97% pure sodium fluoride and double distilled or deionized water. Among the thousands of clinical studies about fluoride, not one has been done with the pollution concentrate or typical tap water containing fluorides.

Synergy Soup

The fluorosilicic acid is also contaminated with small traces of arsenic, cadmium, mercury, lead, sulfates, iron and phosphorous, not to mention radionuclides. Some contaminants have the potential to react with the hexafluorosilicate radical and may act as complex ionic compounds. The biological fates and toxicokinetic properties of these complex ions are unknown.

The reality of artificial water fluoridation is so complex that determining the safety of the practice may be impossible. Tap water is chemically treated with chlorine, soluble silicates, phosphate polymers and many other chemicals. In addition, the source water itself may contain a variety of contaminants.

The addition of a fluoridation agent can create synergized toxicants in a water supply that have unique toxico-kinetic properties found only in that particular water supply. Consequently, any maladies resulting from chronic ingestion of the product likely would be dismissed as a local or regional anomaly unrelated to water fluoridation.

Technically, artificially fluoridating drinking water is a violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Under statutes of the SDWA, federal agencies are forbidden from endorsing, supporting, requiring or funding the practice of adding any chemicals to the water supply other than for purposes of water purification. However, the Public Health Service (PHS) applies semantics to circumvent Federal law in order to promote and fund the practice.

PHS states that they only recommend levels of fluorides in the drinking water, and it is the sole decision of a state or community to fluoridate drinking water.

Federal agencies are forbidden from directly funding or implementing water fluoridation but Federal Block Grants are given to States to use as they see fit. Through second and third parties (such as the American Dental Association, state health departments and state fluoridation coordinators), PHS encourages communities to apply for Federal Block Grant funds to implement fluoridation.

The legality of using of Federal Block Grant funds to fund water fluoridation, a practice prohibited by Federal law, has never been addressed in the courts.

Vendors selling the pollution concentrate as a fluoridation agent use a broad disclaimer found on the Material Data Safety Sheet that states: "no responsibility can be assumed by vendor for any damage or injury resulting from abnormal use, from any failure to adhere to recommended practices, or from any hazards inherent to the product." [Emphasis added.]

The next time you turn on the tap and water gushes out into a glass, reflect on the following disclaimer from the EPA's 1997 Fluoride: Regulatory Fact Sheet: "In the United States, there are no Federal safety standards which are applicable to additives, including those for use in fluoridating drinking water."

George Glasser is a Florida-based writer whose work has appeared in Newlife, Whole Life Times, the Sarasota ECO Report and the Tampa Tribune.
 
Testing, Testing PDF Print E-mail

Testing, Testing

By Gene Franks

source: purewatergazette
 

All men naturally desire to know.--Aristotle.

In the great Renaissance novel Gargantua et Pantagruel, Rabelais told of a judge who decided cases by throwing dice. Rabelais approved, reasoning that with the dice the accused had a chance. In the French courts of the day, the accused had no chance at all. In the tribunals of modern medicine, the patient-accused would usually get a fairer shake if dice were the testing method.

The doleful inaccuracy of mammography (see Marilyn Kaggen's article on "Breast Cancer ," from our article archive), which can lead to slicing off healthy breasts, is well documented. But women are not the only victims of inaccurate tests. Men get the same raw deal with the much-advertised prostate specific antigen (PSA) blood test. Here is Bina Robinson from the Autumn, 1993 Civil Abolitionist:

    In 1989, PSA-producer Schering Plough Corporation paid the Burson-Marsteller public relations firm $1.2 million to launch Prostate Cancer Awareness Week and promote the use of the test as a general screening device for detecting the presence of prostate cancer, even though it had been approved only for monitoring.

    Today 92% of urologists report routine use of the test for men over 50. It costs $50-$80 and produces false positives, leading to further testing, in 20% of the patients. It also produces false negatives in 25% of patients who actually do have prostate cancer. In short, it may be of value to 55% of the patients screened. Economists estimate that screening all American men over 50 would add $28 billion a year to national health care costs.

    Doctors disagree on whether a test with such a high rate of false negatives and positives should be used routinely, but the decision is being made by patients who request it as a result of the cleverly-contrived Prostate Cancer Awareness Week and the backing of the American Cancer Society. The irony is that detecting of those with prostate cancer cells may not be helpful. A Veterans Administration study of 111 men found no difference in the death rates of those who underwent surgery and those assigned to "watchful waiting."

Dr. John McDougall (Your Good Health, Jan./Feb. 1994) agrees that "there is harm from early detection" of prostate cancer, "mostly because detection leads to treatment." Prostate cancer, second only to lung cancer as a killer of men, has become a major source of surgeries of questionable necessity and merit.

Over a decade ago, before the prominence of the pitifully inaccurate PSA, Dr. Robert Mendelsohn warned: "Surgeons tend to do needle biopsies of the prostate in older men without telling them that in a significant portion of these men, say about 30 percent over the age of 50 and 50 percent over the age of 60, that the biopsy will yield malignant-looking cells which will never become malignant in reality." Many of the "cancer cures" touted in cancer establishment promotions involve removal of just such "cancers" that were better left alone. (Incontinence and impotence are the frequent "complications" of both surgery and radiation treatment of the prostate.) Even U.S. News and World Report (11-22-93) recommends that some men with prostate cancer would do best to forgo all testing and quotes Dr. John Wennberg of Dartmouth Medical School, who coined the term "watchful waiting," as saying that prostrate treatment "at best offers limited benefits for most patients" and that some patients, especially older ones, would do best simply to "put the diagnosis of cancer out of their minds, if they can, and perhaps even consider forgoing monitoring." Prostate Cancer Awareness Week was designed to not let you put it out of your mind.

Do you know who sponsors Breast Cancer Awareness Month (BCAM), with its monotonous "early detection is your best protection" slogan? Hint: it isn't a benevolent non-profit group that loves women and wants to protect their breasts. The sole financial sponsor is Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). ICI, a multi-national with sales approaching $30 billion annually, is among the world's largest producers of chlorine- and petroleum-based products (paints, plastics, explosives. pharmaceuticals). ICI founded Breast Cancer Awareness Month in the early 1980s and has spent several million dollars promoting it. ICI approves or vetoes every poster, pamphlet and advertisement used in the campaign. "Not surprisingly," writes investigative reporter Monte Paulsen, "carcinogens are never mentioned in BCAM's widely distributed literature," ("The Politics of Cancer," Nov./Dec. 1993 Utne Reader.)

Certainly a conglomerate that sucks in thirty thousand millions of dollars each year is investing wisely by putting a million or so tax-deductible dollars into a program that covers its corporate ass by blaming the victims of its products for their misfortunes. The implicit BCAM message is always the same: "If you get breast cancer, it's because you weren't a good girl. You didn't get your checkups." The blame-the-victim strategy, hallmark of the AIDS campaign as well, is a familiar tactic. But for ICI, BCAM is an even sweeter deal since it happens that Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, an ICI spin-off enterprise, is the maker of the leading chemical treatment for breast cancer.

Tamoxifen citrate (Zeneca's trade name is Nolvadex), a $500 million per year product, will not cure breast cancer, but is said to slow its progress. (Does this remind you of AZT?) Clearly, "early detection" is a priority, since a woman who detects cancer earlier becomes a Nolvadex customer earlier. But it doesn't stop there. Nolvadex is currently approved only for treatment of existing breast cancers. It is known to cause blood clots, uterine cancer, and liver cancer, but the assumption is that the benefit to women with breast cancer outweighs the risk. Last year, however, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) began a study with 16,000 "healthy" U.S. and Canadian women, half of whom will receive Tamoxifen to see if the anti-estrogen drug will prevent cancer. Dr. Samuel Epstein, professor of occupational and environmental medicine at the U. of Illinois Medical Center in Chicago, calls the test "a scientific and ethical travesty" and says that conducting it "verges on criminal recklessness." The test will cost $70 million taxpayer dollars (almost half of NCI's annual breast cancer research budget) and will, of course, benefit ICI immensely should Tamoxifen-takers have a few fewer breast cancers than the control group. If this should happen, Monte Paulsen concludes, "Nolvadex will become a multi-billion-dollar-a-year drug. Every woman on the planet would be a potential customer. In the meantime, ICI continues to sell almost a half a billion dollars worth of treatment each year for a disease that it may be causing by selling tens of billions of dollars worth of toxic chemicals each year."

Why People Love Medical Tests

 

A segment of the U.S. Population now regards the human body as a two-legged automobile. If something malfunctions, they take it to the mechanic.--William Harris, M.D.

A seldom-discussed aspect of medical costs and hazards is medical testing Testing is a sacred cow. Many who reject allopathic medicine's slash/poison/bum treatment style subscribe to the "better safe than sorry'' logic that sustains one of the industry's most lucrative branches.

The extensiveness of medical testing is stunning. Speaking of the early 1980s-- and since then greater numbers have assuredly been achieved--Dr. Edward R. Pinckney noted: "When all direct and related costs for medical testing are added together--including office visits and hospital charges--the annual bill for medical testing, in 1983, came to about 160 billion dollars, or about half of the entire cost of all medical care" ("The Accuracy of Medical Testing," in Dissent in Medicine: Nine Doctors Speak Out.)

Doctors often excuse their obvious over-exuberance in ordering tests by saying that much "defensive" testing is necessary to protect them from lawyers. This is no doubt true. But the "better safe than sorry" philosophy has been very successfully promoted in an effort to make testing a synonym of prevention in the popular mind. This is, without doubt, one of the Church of Medicine's most lucrative beliefs.

Testing has become Big Medicine's darling for several reasons. The most obvious is that the tests are very profitable for doctors. Doctors buy test equipment for the same reason that merchants put in vending machines. An electrocardiograph machine, according to Dr. Pinckney, can pay for itself in a few months and easily yield a profit of $20,000 per year if the doctor uses it only once or twice a day, which is easy enough since, after all, it is better to be safe than sorry. In spite of highly touted advances in diagnostic testing, Dr. Pinckney says, doctors diagnose the probability of less than half of all heart attacks that end in death.

Doctors also love tests because they offer an opportunity to prospect for business at the patient's expense. Did you ever hear of anyone who went to an eye doctor for an exam and found that he didn't need glasses? The routine "physical" gives the medical doctor virtual carte blanche to look through one's inner spaces for things that need fixing. This very profitable search for villains within led Canadian physician Dr. Mercer Rang to coin the term "Ulysses syndrome." Ulysses wandered about the planet for a dozen years after the Trojan war seeking rights to wrong and monsters to vanquish. When a physician undertakes a series of investigative adventures through one's inner caverns in search of a Cyclops to exorcise, the patient is exposed to all the considerable physical, mental and financial hazards of Ulysses syndrome.

Another reason the medical community loves diagnostic testing is that it is so wonderfully unreliable. One test leads to another and to another. Tests are rated according to their sensitivity (their ability to indicate the presence of the disease the doctor-adventurer is searching for) and their specificity (the test's ability to show a negative, or normal, result when the sought-after disease isn't present). Accuracy is determined by balancing specificity and sensitivity. The PSA prostate cancer test discussed above by Bina Robinson is 80% specific and 75% sensitive, therefore 55% accurate. In practical terms, a man's chances of finding out if he has prostate cancer by submitting to the PSA is about 5% better, and $75 more expensive, than by simply flipping a coin: heads I have it, tails I don't. Incredibly, some very expensive tests are less than 50% accurate.

A widely-used X-ray test for the condition known by doctors as "gastro esophageal reflux" and by TV commercial viewers as "heartburn' requires the patient to swallow a chemical called barium and submit to X-rays, often in an inverted position. It is considered only about 33% accurate. But not to worry. At least ten other tests, most of them almost equally inaccurate, can be used to verify the X-ray test. The most reliable of these is also the least expensive. It involves simply swallowing a pill hooked to a string, then pulling it back up to measure the pH. It is 80% accurate, costs $10, and involves the least degree of risk, but it is seldom Dr. Ulysses' test of choice. According to Dr. Pinckney, the well-known stress electrocardiograph test, which costs from several hundred to more than a thousand dollars, is less than 40% accurate. Moreover, of every 10,000 people who take this test, which seeks to record the heart's action during physical exertion, at least four have a heart attack while the test is being performed.

Why, then, if tests are expensive, inaccurate, undignified, and unsafe, do people flock to doctors' offices to have them performed? Much, surely, has to do with the totally illogical myth that testing equals prevention. How having one's breasts X-rayed prevents cancer is a mystery that only the high priests of Medicine can fathom. Dr. Pinckney's opinion--and he has written two books on the subject of testing--is that medical testing flourishes mainly because people will sacrifice almost anything to be the center of attention. They will endure being stabbed, hooked to Frankensteinish machines, given chemical enemas, photographed upside down and poked and prodded in private places--all for the feeling of importance they get from having all that attention lavished upon them. Probably it has to do with being weaned too early or not getting enough attention from mommy and daddy

While I can't disagree with Dr. Pinckney, my own view is that the allure of testing has as much to do with our fear of dying as our craving for attention. However irrational it may seem, we seek reassurance from the Doctor/Priest: "Doctor, I have sinned. Consult the Oracle and tell me what must I do to be saved." The Doctor then performs the high-tech hocus pocus we have been taught to believe in and solemnly gives us the Oracle's decision. If our sins have been grave, a heavy penance is exacted. What we long to hear is: "What you feared was cancer is only gastro esophageal reflux. Take these magic pills. Go and sin no more."
 
The Silence Surrounding Diagnostic Errors PDF Print E-mail

source: healthbeatblog.org  

June 06, 2008

The Silence Surrounding Diagnostic Errors; Part I

This post was written by Maggie Mahar and Niko Karvounis

Despite all of the talk about medical errors and patient safety, almost no one likes to talk about diagnostic errors. Yet doctors misdiagnose patients more often than we would like to think. Sometimes they diagnose patients with illnesses they don’t have. Other times, the true condition is missed.  All in all, diagnostic errors account for 17 percent of adverse events in hospitals according to the “Harvard Medical Practice Study,” a landmark study that looks at medical errors.

Traditionally, these errors have not received much attention from researchers or the public.  This is understandable. Thinking about missed diagnosis and wrong diagnosis makes everyone—patients as well as doctors—queasy. Especially because there is no obvious solution.  But this past weekend the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) made a brave effort to spotlight the problem, holding its first-ever “Diagnostic Error in Medicine” conference. 

Hats off to Bob Wachter, Associate Chairman of the Department of Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco, and the keynote speaker at the conference. On Monday, Wachter shared some thoughts on diagnostic errors through his blog, “Wachter’s World.”

Wachter begins by pointing out that a misdiagnosis lacks the concentrated shock value that is needed to grab the public imagination. Diagnostic mistakes “often have complex causal pathways, take time to play out, and may not kill for hours [i.e., if a doctor misses myocardial infarction in a patient], days (missed meningitis) or even years (missed cancers).” In short, to understand diagnostic errors you need to pay attention for a longer period of time—not something that’s easy to do in today’s sound-bite driven culture.

Diagnostic errors just aren’t media friendly. When someone is prescribed the wrong medication and they die, the sequence of events is usually rapid enough that the story can be told soon after the tragedy occurs. But the consequences of a mistaken diagnosis are too diffuse to make a nice, punchy story. As Wachter puts it: “They don’t pack the same visceral wallop as wrong-site surgery.”

Finally, Wachter observes, it’s hard to measure diagnostic errors. It’s easy get an audience’s attention by telling them that “the average hospitalized patient experiences one medication error a day” or that “the average ICU patient has 1.7 errors per day in their care.”

But we don’t have equally clean numbers on missed diagnoses. As a result, he points out, “it’s difficult to convince policy makers and hospital executives, who are now obsessing about lowering the rates of hospital-acquired infections and falls” to focus on a problem that is much more difficult to tabulate.

This is a recurring problem in programs that strive to improve the quality of care: we are mesmerized by the idea of “measuring” everything. Yet, too often, what is most important cannot be easily measured.
Wacther recognizes the urgency of the problem:  “As quality and safety movements gallop along, the need to” address Diagnostic Errors “grows more pressing,” he writes. “Until we do, we will face a fundamental problem: a hospital can be seen as a high quality organization – receiving awards for being a stellar performer and oodles of cash from P4P programs – if all of its ‘pneumonia’ patients receive the correct antibiotics, all its ‘CHF’ patients are prescribed ACE inhibitors, and all its ‘MI’ patients get aspirin and beta blockers.

“Even if every one of the diagnoses was wrong.”

Why So Many Errors?

Medicine is shot through with uncertainty; diseases do not always present neatly, in textbook fashion, and every human body is unique. These are just a few reasons why diagnosis is, perhaps, the most difficult part of medicine.

But misdiagnosis almost always can be traced to cognitive errors in how doctors think. When diagnosis is based on simple observation in specialties like radiology and pathology, which rely heavily on visual interpretation, error rates probably range from 2 percent to 5 percent, according to Drs. Eta  S. Berner and Mark L. Graber, writing in the May issue of the American Journal of Medicine.

By contrast, in clinical specialties that rely on “data gathering and synthesis” rather than observation, error rates tend run as high as 15 percent.  After reviewing “an extensive and ever-growing literature” on misdiagnosis, Berner and Graber conclude that “diagnostic errors exist at nontrivial and sometimes alarming rates. These studies span every specialty and virtually every dimension of both inpatient and outpatient care.”

As the table below reveals, numerous studies show that the rate of misdiagnosis is “disappointingly high” both “for relatively benign conditions” and “for disorders where rapid and accurate diagnosis is essential, such as myocardial infarction, pulmonary embolism, and dissecting or ruptured aortic aneurysms.”

STUDY NAME: Shojania et al (2002)
ASSESSED CONDITION: Tuberculosis of the lungs (bacterial infection)   
FINDINGS: Reviewing  autopsy studies specifically focused on the diagnosis of lung TB,  researchers found that  50% of these diagnoses were not suspected by physicians before the patient died.

STUDY: Pidenda et al (2001)
CONDITION: Pulmonary embolism ( a blood clot blocks arteries in the lungs)   
FINDINGS: This study reviewed diagnosis of fatal dislodged blood clots over a 5-yr period at a single institution. Of 67 patients who died of pulmonary embolism, clinicians didn’t suspect the diagnosis in 37 (55%) of them.

STUDY: Lederle et al (1994), von Kodolitsch et al (2000)
CONDITION: Ruptured aortic aneurysm (when a weakened, bulging area in the aorta ruptures)
FINDINGS: These two studies reviewed cases at a single medical center over a 7-yr period. Of 23 cases involving these aneurysms in the abdomen, diagnosis of rupture was initially missed in 14 (61%); in patients presenting with chest pain, doctors missed the need to dissect the bulging part of the aorta in 35% of cases.

STUDY: Edlow (2005)
CONDITION: Subarachnoid hemorrhage (bleeding in a particular region of the brain)   
FINDINGS: This study, an updated review of published studies on this particular type of brain bleeding, shows about 30% are misdiagnosed on initial evaluation.

STUDY: Burton et al (1998)
CONDITION: Cancer detection   
FINDINGS: Autopsy study at a single hospital: of the 250 malignant tumors found at autopsy, 111 were either misdiagnosed or undiagnosed, and in just 57 of the cases the cause of death was judged to be related to the cancer.

STUDY: Beam et al (1996)
CONDITION: Breast cancer   
FINDINGS: Looked at 50 accredited centers agreed to review mammograms of 79 women, 45 of whom had breast cancer. The centers missed cancer in 21% of the patients. 

STUDY: McGinnis et al (2002)
CONDITION: Melanoma (skin cancer)   
FINDINGS: This study, the second review of 5,136 biopsy samples found that diagnosis changed in 11% (1.1% from benign to malignant, 1.2% from malignant to benign, and 8% had a change in doctors’ ranking of how abnormal the cells were) of the samples over time, suggesting a not insignificant initial error rate.

STUDY: Perlis (2005)
CONDITION: Bipolar disorder   
FINDINGS: The initial diagnosis was wrong in 69% of patients with bipolar disorder and delays in establishing the correct diagnosis were common.

STUDY: Graff et al (2000)
CONDITION: Appendicitis (inflamed appendix)   
FINDINGS: Retrospective study at 12 hospitals of patients with abdominal pain and operations for appendicitis. Of 1,026 patients who had surgery, there was no appendicitis in 110 (10.5%); of 916 patients with a final diagnosis of appendicitis, the diagnosis was missed or wrong in 170 (18.6%).

STUDY: Raab et al (2005)
CONDITION: Cancer pathology (microscopic examination of tissues and cells to detect cancer)   
FINDINGS: The frequency of errors in diagnosing cancer was measured at 4 hospitals over a 1-yr period. The error rate of pathologic diagnosis was 2%–9% for gynecology cases and 5%–12% for non-gynecology cases; errors ran from what tissues the doctors used, to preparation problems, to misinterpretations of tissue anatomy when viewed under microscope.

STUDY: Buchweitz et al (2005)
CONDITION: Endometriosis (tissue similar to the lining of the uterus is found elsewhere in the body)    
FINDINGS: Digital videotapes of the inside of patients’ bodies were shown to 108 gynecologic surgeons. Surgeons agreed only 18 percent of the time as to how many tissue areas were actually affected by this condition.

STUDY: Gorter et al (2002)
CONDITION: Psoriatic arthritis (red, scaly skin coupled with join inflammation)   
FINDINGS: 1 of 2 patients with psoriatic arthritis visited 23 joint and motor specialists; the diagnosis was missed or wrong in 9 visits (39%).

STUDY: Bogun et al (2004)
CONDITION: Atrial fibrillation (abnormal heart beat in the upper chambers of the heart)   
FINDINGS: Review of doctor readings of electro-cardiograms [a graphical recording of the change in body electricity due to cardiac activity] that concluded a patient suffered from this abnormal heart beat found that: 35% of the patients were misdiagnosed by the machine, and the error was detected by the reviewing clinician only 76% of the time.

STUDY: Arnon et al (2006)
CONDITION: Infant botulism (toxic bacterial infection in newborns’ intestines)   
FINDINGS: Study of 129 infants in California suspected of having botulism during a 5-yr period; only 50% of the cases were suspected at the time of admission.

STUDY: Edelman (2002)
CONDITION: Diabetes (high blood sugar due to insufficient insulin)   
FINDINGS: Retrospective review of 1,426 patients with laboratory evidence of diabetes showed that there was no mention of diabetes in the medical record of 18% of patients.

STUDY: Russell et al (1988)
CONDITION: Chest x-rays in the Emergency Department   
FINDINGS: One third of x-rays were incorrectly interpreted by the Emergency Department staff compared with the final readings by radiologists.

Overconfidence

Misdiagnosis rarely springs from a “lack of knowledge per se, such as seeing a patient with a disease that the physician has never encountered before,” Berner and Grave explain.  “More commonly, cognitive errors reflect problems gathering data, such as failing to elicit complete and accurate information from the patient; failure to recognize the significance of data, such as misinterpreting test results; or most commonly, failure to synthesize or ‘put it all together.’” 

The breakdown in clinical reasoning often occurs because the physician isn’t willing or able to “reflect on [his] own thinking processes and critically examine [his] assumptions, beliefs, and conclusions.” In a word, the physician is too “confident.” 

Indeed, Berner and Graber find an inverse relationship between confidence and skill.  In one study they reviewed, the researchers looked at diagnoses made by medical students, residents and physicians and asked them how certain they were that they were correct.  The good news is that while medical students were less accurate, they also were less confident; meanwhile the attending physicians were the most accurate, and highly confident. The bad news is that the residents were more confident than the others, but significantly less accurate than the attending physicians. In another study, researchers found that residents often stayed wedded to an incorrect diagnosis even when a diagnostic decision support system suggested the correct diagnosis.

In a third study of 126 patients who died in the ICU and underwent autopsy, physicians were asked to provide the clinical diagnosis and also their level of uncertainty. Level 1 represented complete certainty, level 2 indicated minor uncertainty, and level 3 designated major uncertainty.  Here the punch line is alarming: clinicians who were “completely certain” of the diagnosis before death were wrong 40% of the time.

Overconfidence or the belief that “I know all I need to know” may help explain what the researchers describe as a “pervasive disinterest in any decision support or feedback, regardless of the specific situation.” Studies show that “physicians admit to having many questions that could be important at the point of care, but which they do not pursue. Even when information resources are automated and easily accessible at the point of care with a computer, one study found that only a tiny fraction of the resources were actually used.”

Research shows that physicians tend to ignore computerized decision-support systems, often in the form of guidelines, alerts, and reminders. “For many conditions, consensus exists on the best treatments and the recommended goals,” Berner and Graber point out. Nevertheless, a comprehensive review of medical practice in the United States found that the care provided deviated from recommended best practices half of the time. In one study, the researchers suggest that the high rate of noncompliance with clinical guidelines relates to “the sociology of what it means to be a professional” in our health care system: “Being a professional connotes possessing expert knowledge in an area and functioning relatively autonomously.” Many physicians have yet to learn that 21st century medicine is too complex for anyone to know everything—even in a single specialty. Medicine has become a team sport. 

But while it’s easy to blame medical “arrogance,” for the high rate of errors,  “there is  ubstantial evidence that overconfidence— that is, miscalibration of one's own sense of accuracy and actual accuracy—is ubiquitous and simply part of human nature” Berner and Graber write. “A striking example derives from surveys of academic professionals, 94% of whom rate themselves in the top half of their profession. Similarly, only 1% of drivers rate their skills below that of the average driver.”

In another study published in the same issue of AMJ, Pat Croskerry and Geoff Norman note that such equanimity regarding one’s own skills can lead to what’s called “confirmation bias.” People “anchor” on findings that support their initial assumptions. Given a set of information, it’s much easier to pull out the data that proves you right and pat yourself on the back than it is to look at the contradictory evidence and rethink your assumptions. Indeed, Croskerry and Norman observe:,“it takes far more mental effort to contemplate disconfirmation--by considering all the other things it might be-- than confirmation.”

Making things all the more difficult is the fact that, at a certain point, the alternative to confirmation bias—what Croskerry and Norman call “consider the opposite”—becomes impractical. If a doctor embraces uncertainty he could easily become paralyzed.

What doctors need to do is to simultaneously make a decision—and keep an open mind. Often, a doctor must embark on a course of treatment as a way of diagnosing the condition—all the time knowing that he may be wrong.

Too often, Berner and Graber observe, physicians narrow the diagnostic hypotheses too early in the process, so that the correct diagnosis is never seriously considered. Reliance on advanced diagnostic tests can encourage what they call “premature closure.”  After all, high-tech diagnostic technologies offer up hard-and-fast- data, fostering the illusion that the physician has vanquished medicine’s ambiguity.

But in truth advanced diagnostic tools can miss critical information. The problem is not the technology, but how we use it. Some observers suggest that the newest and most sophisticated tools are more likely to produce false negatives because doctors accept the results so readily.

“In most cases, it wasn’t the technology that failed,” explains Dr. Atul Gawande in Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science. “Rather, the physician did not consider the right diagnosis in the first place. The perfect test or scan may have been available, but the physician never ordered it.” Instead, he ordered another test—and believed it.

“We get this all the time,” Bill Pellan of Florida’s Penallas-Pasca County Medical Examiner’s Office told the New York Times a few years ago. “The doctor will get our report and call and say: ‘But there can’t be a lacerated aorta. We did a whole set of scans.’

“We have to remind him we held the heart in our hands.”

In the second part of the post, we’ll address the fact that most physicians have no way of knowing how often they may be missing the diagnosis because they don’t receive any feed-back: they never find out how the story ends. Maggie will also talk about “the most powerful tool in the history of medicine”—the autopsy.

Posted by Maggie Mahar on June 6, 2008

 

 


The Silence Surrounding Diagnostic Errors; Part II

Sometimes physicians are overly confident; sometimes they narrow their hypothesis too early in the diagnostic process. Sometimes they rely too heavily on advanced diagnostic tests and accept the results too quickly. As I explained in part one of this post, these are some of the reasons why physicians misdiagnose their patients up to 15 percent of the time. Of all medical errors, misdiagnosis is the one that we talk about least—in part, because we don’t know what to do about it, in part because most doctors have no way of knowing how many diagnostic errors they make.

“Complacency” (i.e. the attitude that “nobody’s perfect”) also is a factor, reports Drs. Eta S. Berner and Mark L. Graber in the May issue of the American Journal of Medicine. “Complacency reflects tolerance for errors, and the belief that errors are inevitable,” they write, “combined with little understanding of how commonplace diagnostic errors are. Frequently, the complacent physician may think that the problem exists, but not in his own practice...

Autopsies

It is crucial to recognize that physicians are not simply deceiving themselves: in our fragmented health care system many honestly don’t know when they have mis-diagnosed a patient. No one tells them—including the patient.

Sometimes a patient who isn’t getting better simply leaves the doctor and finds someone else. His original doctor may well assume that he was finally cured. Or the patient may be discharged from the hospital, relapse three months later, and go to a different ER where he discovers that his symptoms have returned because he was, in fact, misdiagnosed. The doctors who cared for him at the first hospital have no way of knowing; they think they cured him. In other cases, the patient gets better despite the wrong diagnosis. (It is surprising how often bodies heal themselves.) Meanwhile, both doctor and patient assume that the diagnosis was right and that the treatment “worked.”

In still other cases, the patient dies, and because everyone assumes that the diagnosis was correct, it is listed as the “cause of death”—when in fact, another condition killed the patient.

When giving talks to groups of physicians on diagnostic errors, Graber says that he frequently “asks whether they have made a diagnostic error in the past year. Typically, only 1% admit to having made such a mistake.”

Here, we reach the heart of the problem: what Berner and Graber call “the remarkable discrepancy between the known prevalence of diagnostic error and physician perception of their own error rate.”  This gap “has not been formally quantified and is only indirectly discussed in the medical literature,” they note “but [it] lies at the crux of the diagnostic error puzzle, and explains in part why so little attention has been devoted to this problem.”

One cannot expect doctors to learn from their mistakes unless they have feedback: At one time, autopsies provided physicians with the information they needed. And the results were regularly discussed at “mortality and morbidity” conferences where doctors became Monday-morning quarterbacks, discussing what they could have done differently.

But today, “autopsies are done in 10 percent of all deaths; many hospitals do none,” notes Dr. Atul Gawande in Complications: A Surgeons Notes on an Imperfect Science. “This is a dramatic turnabout. Throughout much of the twentieth century, doctors diligently obtained autopsies in the majority of all death…Autopsies have long been viewed as a tool of discovery, one that has been used to identify the cause of tuberculosis, reveal how to treat appendicitis, and establish the existence of Alzheimer’s disease.

“So what accounts for the decline?” Gawande asks. “In truth, it’s not because families refuse—to judge from recent studies, they still grant their permission up to 80 percent of the time. Instead, doctors once so eager to perform autopsies that they stole bodies [from graves] have simply stopped asking.

“Some people ascribe this to shady motives,” Gawande continues. “It has been said that hospitals are trying to save money by avoiding autopsies, since insurers don’t pay for them, or that doctors avoid them in order to cover up evidence of malpractice. And yet,” he points out, “autopsies lost money and uncovered malpractice when they were popular, too.”

Gawande doesn’t believe that fear of malpractice has driven the decline in autopsies. Instead,” he writes, “I suspect, what discourages autopsies is medicine’s twenty-first-century, tall-in-the-saddle confidence.”

This is an important point. Autopsies have fallen out of fashion in recent years: “Between 1972 and 1995, the last year for which statistics are available, the rate fell from 19.1 percent of all deaths to 9.4 percent. A major reason for the decline over this period is that “imaging technologies such as CT scanning and ultrasound have enabled doctors to ‘see’ such obvious internal causes of death as tumors before the patient dies”, says Dr. Patrick Lantz, associate professor of pathology at Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center. Nowadays an autopsy seems a waste of time and resources.

Gawande agrees: “Today we have MRI scans, ultra-sound, nuclear medicine, molecular testing, and much more. When somebody dies, we already know why. We don’t need an autopsy to find out…Or so I thought…” Gawande then goes on to tell the story of a autopsy that rocked him. He had completely misdiagnosed a patient.

What Autopsies Show

The autopsy has been described as “the most powerful tool in the history of medicine” and the “gold standard” for detecting diagnostic errors.  Indeed, Gawande points out that three studies done in 1998 and 1999 reveal that autopsies “turn up a major misdiagnosis in roughly 40 percent of all cases.”

A large review of autopsy studies concluded that “in about a third of the misdiagnoses the patients would have been expected to live if property treatment had been administered,” Gawande reports. “Dr. George Lundberg, a pathologist and former editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, has done more than anyone to call attention to these figures. He points out the most surprising fact of all: the rate at which misdiagnosis is detected in autopsy studies have not improved since at least 1938.”

When Gawande first heard these numbers he couldn’t’ believe them. “With all of the recent advances in imaging and diagnostics . . . it’s hard to accept that we have failed to improve over time.” To see if this really could be true, he and other doctors at Harvard put together a simple study. They went back into their hospital records to see how often autopsies picked up missed diagnosis in 1960 and 1970, before the advent of CT, ultrasound, nuclear scanning and other technologies, and then in 1980, after those technologies became widely used.

Gawande reports the results of the study: “The researchers found no improvement. Regardless of the decade, physicians missed a quarter of fatal infections, a third of heart attacks and almost two-thirds of pulmonary emboli in their patients who died.”

But these numbers may exaggerate the rate of error. As Berner and Graber observe, “autopsy studies only provide the error rate in patients who die.” One can assume that the error rate is much lower in patients who survived. 

“For example, whereas autopsy studies suggest that fatal pulmonary embolism is misdiagnosed approximately 55% of the time, the misdiagnosis rate for all cases of pulmonary embolism is only 4%...” a large discrepancy also exists regarding the misdiagnosis rate for myocardial infarction: although autopsy data suggest roughly 20% of these events are missed, data from the clinical setting (patients presenting with chest pain or other relevant symptoms) indicate that only 2% to 4% are missed.”

Still, they acknowledge that when laymen are trained to pretend to be a patient suffering from specific symptoms, studies show that “internists missed the correct diagnosis 13% of the time. Other studies have found that physicians can even disagree with themselves when presented again with a case they have previously diagnosed.”

On the question of whether the diagnostic error rate has changed over time, Berner and Graber quote researchers who suggest that the near-constant rate of misdiagnosis found at autopsy over the years probably reflects two factors that offset each other:

  1. diagnostic accuracy actually has improved over time (more knowledge, better tests, more skills);
  2. but as the autopsy rate declines, there is a tendency to select only the more challenging clinical cases for autopsy, which then have a higher likelihood of diagnostic error. A long-term study of autopsies in Switzerland (where the autopsy rate has remained constant at 90%) supports the theory that the absolute rate of diagnostic errors is, as suggested, decreasing over time.

Nevertheless, nearly everyone agrees, the rate of diagnostic errors remains too high.

We need to revive the autopsy, Gawande argues. For “autopsies not only document the presence of diagnostic errors, they also provide an opportunity to learn from one's errors (errando discimus) if one takes advantage of the information.

“The rate of autopsy in the United States is not measured any more,” he observes, “but is widely assumed to be significantly <10%. To the extent that this important feedback mechanism is no longer a realistic option, clinicians have an increasingly distorted view of their own error rates.

“Autopsy literally means “to see for oneself,” Gawande observes, and despite our knowledge and technology, when we look we are often unprepared for what we find. Sometimes it turns out that we had missed a clue along the way or made a genuine mistake. Sometimes we turn out wrong despite doing everything right.

“Whether with living patients or dead, we cannot know until we look… But doctors are no longer asking such questions. Equally troubling, people seem happy to let us off the hook. In 1995, the United States National Center for Health Statistics stopped collecting autopsy statistics altogether. We can no longer even say how rare autopsies have become.”

If they are going to reflect on their mistakes, physicians need to “see for themselves.”

Posted by Maggie Mahar on June 9, 2008
 
Non-cardiac Pre-Op beta blockers Increase Risk of Death PDF Print E-mail

The Lancet  2008; 371:1839-1847

DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(08)60601-7

Articles

Effects of extended-release metoprolol succinate in patients undergoing non-cardiac surgery (POISE trial): a randomised controlled trial

 

Summary

Background

Trials of β blockers in patients undergoing non-cardiac surgery have reported conflicting results. This randomised controlled trial, done in 190 hospitals in 23 countries, was designed to investigate the effects of perioperative β blockers.

Methods

We randomly assigned 8351 patients with, or at risk of, atherosclerotic disease who were undergoing non-cardiac surgery to receive extended-release metoprolol succinate (n=4174) or placebo (n=4177), by a computerised randomisation phone service. Study treatment was started 2–4 h before surgery and continued for 30 days. Patients, health-care providers, data collectors, and outcome adjudicators were masked to treatment allocation. The primary endpoint was a composite of cardiovascular death, non-fatal myocardial infarction, and non-fatal cardiac arrest. Analyses were by intention to treat. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00182039.

Findings

All 8351 patients were included in analyses; 8331 (99·8%) patients completed the 30-day follow-up. Fewer patients in the metoprolol group than in the placebo group reached the primary endpoint (244 [5·8%] patients in the metoprolol group vs 290 [6·9%] in the placebo group; hazard ratio 0·84, 95% CI 0·70–0·99; p=0·0399). Fewer patients in the metoprolol group than in the placebo group had a myocardial infarction (176 [4·2%] vs 239 [5·7%] patients; 0·73, 0·60–0·89; p=0·0017). However, there were more deaths in the metoprolol group than in the placebo group (129 [3·1%] vs 97 [2·3%] patients; 1·33, 1·03–1·74; p=0·0317). More patients in the metoprolol group than in the placebo group had a stroke (41 [1·0%] vs 19 [0·5%] patients; 2·17, 1·26–3·74; p=0·0053).

Interpretation

Our results highlight the risk in assuming a perioperative β-blocker regimen has benefit without substantial harm, and the importance and need for large randomised trials in the perioperative setting. Patients are unlikely to accept the risks associated with perioperative extended-release metoprolol.

Funding

Canadian Institutes of Health Research; Commonwealth Government of Australia's National Health and Medical Research Council; Instituto de Salud Carlos III (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo), Spain; British Heart Foundation; AstraZeneca.

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Polio: the virus and the vaccine PDF Print E-mail

A nice, enlightening treatise on the modern history of Polio, and a much needed questioning of the aetiology of the disease. From the ecologist.org

 

Polio: the virus and the vaccine

There is a rarely mentioned epidemic raging in the world today, one that is crippling children in more than 100 countries. In extreme cases the disease starts with a fever, which is followed by vomiting, delirium and spreading pain. Within days of being infected, the motor-neurone cells in victims’ spines cease to function properly. Pain intensifies as victims’ limbs are paralysed. In the very worst cases, their chests are also paralysed, which prevents them from breathing. Even when the children recover, the illness often returns in later life. Health authorities say it has no cure. The number of cases increased by over 250 per cent worldwide between 1996 and 2003 1. It is a disease with a long history and many names. The condition’s official name now is ‘Acute Flaccid Paralysis’ but it was once known as ‘infantile paralysis’/ ‘poliomyelitis’ (polio for short). Some people called it ‘the crippler’. A shot in the dark Polio is a devastating disease; the preferred method for fighting it is vaccination. Yet there is a mass of historic evidence that suggests it is not caused by a virus but by industrial and agricultural pollution.

Date:01/05/2004 Author:Janine Roberts

During the first half of the 20th century infantile paralysis surged like a bush fire, moving from place to place, afflicting large numbers of children, but only in the industrialised West. Prior to these outbreaks it affected very few and was often called ‘palsy’. In the 19th century scientists gave it the name ‘poliomyelitis’, referring to the inflammation of the grey nerves of the spinal column in cases of paralysis. Poisonous metals were suspected of causing this disease, particularly lead, arsenic and mercury. In 1824 the English scientist John Cooke stated: ‘The fumes of these metals, or the receptance of them in solution into the stomach, often cause paralysis.’ 2

In 1878 the link between palsy and toxins was strengthened when Alfred Vulpian found that dogs dosed with lead suffered the same damage in their motor-neurone cells as found in the human victims of infantile paralysis.3 The Russian Popow discovered in 1883 that the same damage could be done with arsenic.4 This should have sent shockwaves through the medical establishment as the arsenic-based pesticide Paris Green had been widely used since 1870 to stop Codling moth caterpillars ruining apple crops. But strangely it didn’t.

In 1892 Paris Green was replaced in Massachusetts by the more toxic pesticide lead arsenate. Two years later the first recorded epidemic of infantile paralysis struck in Massachusetts’ neighbouring state of Vermont. The outbreak was investigated by Dr Charles Caverly, who reported that it was probably caused by a toxin rather than a micro-organism. Caverly said: ‘It usually occurred in families of more than one child, and as no efforts were made at isolation it was very certain it was non-contagious.’ 5

Lead arsenate rapidly became the principal pesticide used on fruit and berries throughout the industrial world. In 1907 calcium arsenate was introduced for use primarily on cotton crops and in cotton mills. A year later 69 healthy children suddenly fell paralytically ill in Massachusetts. They lived in a town with three cotton mills, and in settlements downstream from those mills. Nearby there were also orchards on which lead arsenates were almost certainly in use. They were also living only a short distance downstream from the location of the Vermont outbreak.

A further epidemic in Massachusetts in 1908 caused enormous public concern, but, despite the evidence that exposure to toxins might have been responsible, the investigating health officials overlooked the newly introduced pesticides; they thought them essential to their war against viruses and bacteria – and to the financial health of the agricultural industry. Thus, the children paralysed in Massachusetts were not treated with toxin antidotes to see if these would benefit them. Instead, parents were advised to keep their children clean while the scientists, distracted by the then brand new theory that all epidemics had to be caused by infectious germs, looked for the virus ‘responsible’.

In 1908 two scientists working in Austria, Karl Landsteiner and Erwin Popper, reported that they might have found an ‘invisible virus’ that had caused these epidemics. They had made their discovery, they claimed, after making a suspension in water of minced diseased spinal cord from a nine-year-old victim of infantile paralysis. They had tested this noxious suspension by injecting one or two cups of it directly into the brains of two monkeys. The monkeys fell severely ill (as might have been predicted). One died and the other had its legs paralysed. The scientists then dissected the monkeys and found damage in their central nervous tissues similar to that found in human cases of infantile paralysis.8

Today the World Health Organisation (WHO) still credits Landsteiner and Popper as having found the poliovirus with this experiment. Why it does so is inexplicable. The fluid they injected must have contained much human cellular debris, any toxins involved in the child’s illness, and probably several kinds of viruses. So, it was no wonder the monkeys fell so desperately ill. Such a soup could in no way be considered an ‘isolate’ of the tiny organism we now call a virus. It was also strangely non-infectious for a so-called virus, for the monkeys were not paralysed when made to drink it or when one of their limbs was injected with it, nor did they pass it on to other monkeys. The experiment, in fact, shed no light on what had paralysed the monkeys, and for that matter, the children.

Nevertheless, the following year Simon Flexner and Paul Lewis of the illustrious Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in the US ‘proved’ a similarly made noxious soup was ‘infectious’ by injecting it into the brain of one monkey. They then extracted some fluid from its brain, injected this into another monkey, and so on through a series of monkeys, paralysing all of them in the process. Flexner and Lewis reported: ‘We failed utterly to discover bacteria… that could account for the disease [paralysis]… The infecting agent of epidemic poliomyelitis [probably] belongs to the class of the minute and filterable viruses that have not thus far been demonstrated with certainty under the microscope.’9 In other words, we’ve injected a cocktail of viruses, cellular debris and DNA into a series of monkeys, and we believe that a virus, not yet identified within this noxious cocktail, is responsible! The procedure of Flexner and Lewis was just as dubious as their conclusion: they took no account of the contaminants in their mashed-up soup; they presumed what happened in monkeys would be replicated in humans; and surprisingly, given the evidence around at the time, they didn’t inject samples of cyanide or lead into the brains of monkeys to see if they also caused paralysis. In 1910 neonatologist L Emmett Holt reported: ‘Even five years ago if anyone had suggested that the disease under discussion was an infectious or contagious one, it would have been looked upon as a joke.’ 10

Nevertheless, this crude science inspired a 40-year hunt for the infantile paralysis virus. All kinds of biological materials – spinal cord, brain, faecal matter, even flies – were ground up and injected into monkeys’ brains to try to induce paralysis.11

[More:]

Meanwhile, US president Franklin D Roosevelt, himself a victim of infantile paralysis, set up in 1938 the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP). The NFIP promptly decided that there was no cure for those already suffering from the disease. It would also refuse to examine reports of successful treatment involving antidotes against toxins. It instead focused on raising money for vaccine research by releasing stories about the horrors of infantile paralysis. The worst cases were indeed frightening: some victims had to be placed in ‘iron lungs’ to help them breathe.

This advertising drive was sensationally successful, effective both in raising money and in spreading fear of the poliovirus, especially among parents. But the authorities had little immediate help for them. They simply advised them to keep their children clean, away from places where infections could be passed on, such as public swimming pools, and to kill flies. The zeal of the parents was encouraged by advertisements showing giant flies attacking children. While the poorer families responded by swatting flies and using more soap and water, the more affluent tried to turn their homes into sterile zones by constantly spraying them with insecticides. But these sprays proved useless. And what was even more perculiar was that doctors reported the disease was affecting mostly the children from better-off families – especially those who ate the most fresh fruit. People thus started to call the disease ‘the middle-class plague’. All this was so utterly inexplicable that parents were left feeling helpless and despairing.

By the end of the 1930s the vaccine scientists had tested various ‘viral isolates’ from infected monkey brains, but when these isolates were fed orally to monkeys the animals did not fall ill. This was most puzzling. The monkeys produced antibodies afterwards, so some virus must have harmlessly infected them. The only way the scientists found they could create a version of infantile paralysis in the monkeys was by injecting large quantities of the ‘virus’ suspensions directly into their brains.

In 1941 the work of the virus hunters received a potentially fatal setback. Dr John Toomey reported in The Journal of Pediatrics that it was not passed between individuals ‘no matter how intimately exposed.’ 12 If the disease was non-infective, then it could not be caused by a virus and thus a vaccine would not work.

Other holes started to appear in the virus theory. During WWII army doctors found widespread immunity to the suspected poliovirus, and no evidence of infantile paralysis epidemics, in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In Turkey they found people who called infantile paralysis ‘the American disease’. The doctors were surprised: immunity to the virus presumably meant that it had infected the population. So, how come it caused no epidemics in these countries?

However, the scientists racing to find a vaccine were so convinced that a virus was to blame that they effectively disregarded any evidence to the contrary. Among these it seems was Jonas Salk. In 1947 he found among the debris and toxins of ‘viral isolates’ from monkey brain experiments what he believed to be the poliovirus. Although he had not proved that this could cause polio in humans, he hoped he could use it to make a vaccine. But the highly respected bacteriologist Claus Jungeblut thought otherwise. He observed that such ‘viral isolates’ did not create in monkeys the same disease as found in human cases of infantile paralysis.13 He concluded: ‘The highly specialised … virus which has been maintained in the past by intra-cerebral passage in rhesus monkeys is more likely a laboratory artefact than the agent which causes the natural disease in man’. In other words, the ‘virus’ found by the vaccine scientists probably did not exist in the wild but was a product of their experiments.14 If he were right, the consequences were vast. It could mean that the ‘isolates’ used by Salk to make a vaccine injected into over a hundred million people, had no relationship to the human disease it was supposed to counter.

Then, in 1948 Gilbert Dalldorf and Grace Sickles of the New York Department of Health triumphantly claimed that they had found the virus in the excrement of paralysed children. They had spun a sample to remove larger particles, diluted it and injected it into the brains of mice. The animals unsurprisingly became dangerously ill and paralysed.15

The news of Dalldorf and Sickles’ experiment was nevertheless welcomed by the vaccine scientists. Up to now they had struggled to find the poliovirus in human spinal tissue. It would now be vastly easier to collect the poliovirus they believed they had identified from human excrement than from human spinal tissue. But why was it so hard to find it in the nerve cells in the spinal column that it supposedly damaged – that is where it had to be, if it really were the cause of infantile paralysis?

In 1951 they discovered a reason why. Quite simply, it was not always there. Instead a different virus might be present eg the Coxsackie virus. This news was grimly received. Their planned polio vaccine would not work against the Coxsackie. There was ‘some feeling of dismay … [this] added one more problem to the nebulous conditions surrounding poliomyelitis… the more we learn about poliomyelitis, the less we know,’ wrote AL Hoynel in the journal The Medical Clinics of North America. A Lancet editorial in the same year said this discovery brought ‘a crop of new snags’ to developing a vaccine.

Soon they discovered that it was possible for many different viruses to be present in these damaged nerve cells. If toxins caused the disease, this would be easy to explain. Many kinds of viruses are attracted to toxin-damaged cells. More bad news for the polio vaccine scientists. The public expected them to deliver vaccines that would stop the epidemics, but it was now evident that their polio vaccines would, at the very best, only prevent some cases, the ones with their poliovirus present.

And yet despite all the doubts and contrary findings, the vaccine research continued. In 1949 John Enders and Thomas Weller discovered how to grow the poliovirus in cell cultures, rather than only in the brains of living animals.16 This made possible the commercial production of virus-based vaccines. Then it was discovered how to grow their poliovirus on cheap monkey kidney and testicle cells.17 Monkeys soon became the ‘growing bed’ for the virus. They would be trapped, imported and slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands to make the polio vaccines, and are still caught in the wild today for the purpose of testing the UK vaccine.

By 1954 Salk had his polio vaccine ready for testing. (He confessed to ‘sacrificing’ some 17,000 monkeys in the process of developing it) He based the vaccine on his theory that children would gain immunity to living poliovirus if dead poliovirus were injected into them. He hoped our sensitive immune system would react by creating antibodies to these viral corpses that would also protect us against living wild poliovirus. To kill the virus he poisoned it with formaldehyde before putting it into his vaccine.

In 1954 he tested this concoction on more than 400,000 US children. It was reported afterwards that ‘only’ 112 of the children who received three jabs of his vaccine contracted polio within the next few months. Salk judged his experiment a success.18 But his safety-test results omitted all cases of children who were paralysed after one or two doses of the vaccine – or within two weeks of taking the third dose. These were counted as cases of polio in the non-vaccinated control groupand thus in my view cast doubt on the validity of his results, for it made it impossible to tell just what impact his vaccine had had. It could have been that many of the cases of polio in the control group were caused by one dose of his vaccine – there was nothing in the published accounts I have seen to say that this was not so.

Salk claimed that his vaccine protected ‘30 to 90 per cent’ of those who received it (a remarkably vague statistic). But more than 60 per cent could have been immune already, at least according to the theory of the US federal agency the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that working-class children were already immune as a result of exposure to the virus in dirt. It is not known if Salk ever checked to see if children were already immune before he vaccinated them, but Hilary Koprowski reported in 1957 that the inhabitants of the Congo were 85 per cent immune before they ever saw a dose of polio vaccine. (Amazingly this didn’t stop Koprowski. He went on to uselessly administer to them hundreds of thousands of doses of his experimental vaccine.)

The Salk vaccine could have been derailed if a 1954 report by Dr Bernice Eddy, the scientist in charge of the US government safety-testing lab, had been taken seriously. Eddy stated that when she tested the Salk vaccine it caused severe paralysis in monkeys. She photographed the diseased monkeys, took these photos to her boss – and was reprimanded as an alarmist. She was not sure what it was in the vaccine that caused the paralysis: was it a virus, cellular debris or a toxin? Something quite deadly was clearly present. (One year later, after her warnings proved true, she was stopped from working on polio.)

On April 12 1955, Salk’s polio vaccine was pronounced totally safe and effective in providing complete protection against poliomyelitis (infantile paralysis), when it was launched by the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis before an invited audience of 500 doctors and 200 journalists. The launch ceremony was relayed by closed-circuit television to some 54,000 doctors in cities throughout the US and Canada. Salk was immediately awarded a Congressional Medal by US president Dwight Eisenhower. Church bells were rung in celebration of Salk’s victory. In The Manchester Guardian, Alistair Cooke wrote: ‘Nothing short of the overthrow of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union could bring such rejoicing to the hearts and homes in America as the historic announcement last Tuesday that the 166-year war against poliomyelitis is almost certainly at an end.’

Medical Fraud

The triumph following the launch of the Salk vaccine was short-lived. The medical historian Dr M Beddow Baily recorded what happened next: ‘Only 13 days after the vaccine had been acclaimed by the whole of the US press and radio as one of the greatest medical discoveries of the century, and two days after the British ministry of health had announced it would go right ahead with the manufacture of the vaccine, came the first news of disaster. Children inoculated with one brand of the vaccine had developed poliomyelitis. In the following days more and more cases were reported, some of them after inoculation with other brands.’ 19

Within two weeks of the launch the number of cases of polio in vaccinated children had nearly reached 200. This created near panic in the White House. President Eisenhower had publicly endorsed the vaccine at its launch, so he sent the US health secretary Oveta Hobby to make it very plain to the Surgeon General that the president needed to be spared the embarrassment of further such cases.

On 8 May 1955 the Surgeon General suspended the entire US production of the vaccine. After hurried meetings between Salk, manufacturers and the surgeon general, distribution of the vaccine was resumed five days later, with new regulations in place to ensure better standards in the vaccine laboratories. The general consensus was that these cases had been caused by viruses in the vaccine that had survived the formaldehyde, despite evidence that repeated injections can cause paralysis. However, despite these new regulations, four months later more than 2,000 cases of infantile paralysis were recorded in Boston, despite the vaccination of 130,000 children in the city. The previous year it had seen only 273 cases. The number of cases doubled in vaccinated New York State and Connecticut, and tripled in Vermont. They increased by five times in both Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Many were paralysed in the injected arm.

It seemed that the vaccine would soon be totally discredited. So, to protect the President, Salk, the vaccine manufacturers and themselves from the humiliation of an unmitigated failure, the US health authorities had to dramatically slash the incidence of poliomyelitis. They managed this by simply changing the way they recorded the incidents of poliomyelitis. It worked like this: Prior to 1956, the authorities recorded a patient as having paralytic polio (infantile paralysis) if they suffered from paralytic symptoms for 24 hours. After 1956 patients had to have these paralytic symptoms for at least 60 days to be counted as having polio. As many people recovered within 60 days, this measure alone dramatically cut the official number of cases. This ‘drop’ in polio cases was publicly credited to the vaccine. Furthermore, all cases of polio occurring within 30 days of vaccination (such as the first 200 cases that had so alarmed the White House) were in future not to be blamed on the vaccine but to be recorded as ‘pre-existing’.

But Salk continued to worry. Despite its regulatory and statistical ‘success’, the reputation of his vaccine was plummeting. In June 1955 the British doctors’ union the Medical Practitioners’ Union wrote: ‘These misfortunes would be almost endurable if a whole new generation were to be rendered permanently immune to the disease. In fact, there is no evidence that any lasting immunity is achieved.’ 21

The following month Canada suspended its distribution of Salk’s vaccine. By November all European countries had suspended distribution plans, apart from Denmark. By January 1957 17 US states had stopped distributing the vaccine. The same year The New York Times reported that nearly 50 per cent of cases of infantile paralysis in children between the ages of five and 14 had occurred after vaccination.

So, more regulatory and statistical changes were needed in order to give the polio vaccine the appearance of a triumph of modern medicine. What better way to achieve this than to reclassify all the cases of polio into numerous other diseases resulting in a massive reduction in polio cases, and a host of other diseases to attract funding. And this is exactly what they did. Prior to 1958 the definition of infantile paralysis (polio) included cases in which paralysis was minimal: perhaps manifesting itself as a very stiff neck, often accompanied by widespread pain. Polio also included cases of ‘meningitis’, or of inflammation of the membrane that protects the brain and spinal neurons. The CDC describes such cases as ‘serious but rarely fatal’.22 Prior to 1958 these cases were scientifically referred to as ‘non-paralytic poliomyelitis’, or polio for short. Henceforward, they would be reclassified. The Los Angeles County health authorities stated: ‘Most cases reported prior to July 1 1958 of non-paralytic poliomyelitis are now reported as viral or aseptic meningitis.’ The incidence of meningitis soared as official polio cases declined, as the following table (compiled from national surveillance reports) shows.
Non-paralytic polio cases Aseptic meningitis cases
1951-1960 70,083 0
1961-1982 589 102,999
1983-1992 0 117,366

(Jim West, Images of Poliomyelitis)

These classifications are still used today. Last year the US National Center for Infectious Diseases reported no cases of poliomyelitis but 30,000 to 50,000 cases of aseptic meningitis requiring hospitalisation. There are probably several times this number of incidents of aseptic meningitis that did not require hospitalisation, but statistics are no longer kept for such cases.

Then another scam was enacted to massage down the poliomyelitis figures. It took advantage of the 1951 discovery that different viruses could be present in cases of infantile paralysis. Prior to 1958 this did not matter. A doctor diagnosed a person with polio by taking note of their evident symptoms. They did not investigate to see if the poliovirus were present. In 1958 a new regulation was put in place requiring doctors to only register a patient as having polio if the poliovirus were present, something that was very difficult to establish for sure. For a start, it was impossible to tell by looking at symptoms. The Textbook of Child Neurology reported: ‘Coxsackie virus and echoviruses can cause paralytic syndromes that are clinically indistinguishable from paralytic poliomyelitis.’ This new requirement for doctors caused a vast drop in the number of cases registered as poliomyelitis – a drop that ever since has been credited solely to the vaccine.

So, when patients diagnosed as having polio in a 1958 epidemic in Detroit were re-tested as required by this new rule, 49 per cent were found to have no poliovirus. They had to be reclassified as having ‘non-poliomyelitis acute flaccid paralysis’ even though they were suffering from symptoms identical to poliomyelitis with the same paralysis and the same pain. Other polio cases were reclassified as ‘Guillian-Barré syndrome’, which some researchers now think is what crippled Roosevelt. Yet more cases are now referred to as ‘Hand, Foot and Mouth Disease’, which can also cause paralysis. And last year the Coxsackie virus was found in cases of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), which sometimes shows polio-like symptoms of muscle damage; in the past CFS might have been classified as a form of polio.

If this process of reclassification had not occurred, it would have been impossible to hide the fact that infantile paralysis cases had sharply increased after the introduction of Salk’s vaccine. Without the Coxsackie and aseptic meningitis reclassifications, for example, the number of reported cases of paralytic polio would have doubled from 2,500 in 1957 to 5,000 in 1959. 23

This deliberate fraud did not go entirely unnoticed, however. Dr Bernard Greenberg, the then head of the Department of Biostatistics at the University of North Carolina, testified at a 1962 Congressional hearing that infantile paralysis cases had increased after the introduction of the vaccine by 50 per cent from 1957 to 1958, and by 80 per cent from 1958 to 1959. He concluded that US health officials had manipulated the statistics to give entirely the opposite impression. 24

Milk paralysis

Many infantile paralysis outbreaks between 1905 and the 1940s would be linked by doctors to supplies of contaminated milk, including one in 1927 in Broadstairs in Kent. The Broadstairs outbreak was fairly typical. It affected institutions such as boarding schools that had little contact with each other, but which took milk from a common source.6 These epidemics ended when suspected milk supplies were stopped. Lead arsenate was being used as a cattle dip, but the formaldehyde that used to be added to milk to prolong its ‘shelf life’ may also have been responsible. (In 1897 The Australian Medical Gazette reported that formaldehyde in milk had caused several cases of paralysis.) 7

Vaccine Paralysis

1 Muscles can be poisoned and paralysed by being repeatedly injected with vaccines or antibiotics; this is now called ‘provocation paralysis’, and was no secret in the 1950s. In 1952 vaccinations had been suspended for the summer in the UK and US (the ‘infantile paralysis season’) as the injected arms of many children had been paralysed. The Lancet had reported: ‘Clinically, the cases associated with recent immunisations were indistinguishable from the acute cases of paralytic poliomyelitis.’ 20 By 1955 US children were receiving three injections with Salk’s polio vaccine, as well as the smallpox and whooping cough vaccines.

2 Also, the Salk vaccine was far from pure. We now know that it was contaminated with a small amount of formaldehyde and viral debris.

What are viruses?

The pharmaceutical industry makes vast profits by exploiting paranoia about viruses, so it is important to understand just what viruses are. When viruses were first discovered they were presumed to be enemies. (The word ‘virus’ is Latin for ‘poisonous fluid’.) This was a serious misconception.

We now know that human bodies need and create viruses. Our cells contain tiny molecular engineers, known as transposons, which cut and adapt our DNA. Sometimes we may need to send genetic code from one cell to another – perhaps so as to resolve genetic problems or to deal with toxins. Cells can do this by turning transposons into messengers that carry genetic code from cell to cell. Travelling transposons are called ‘endogenous’ viruses: we manufacture them ourselves. They are essential to our genetic information highway. We make millions of such viruses.

Other viruses are ‘exogenous’: they originate from outside the human body. They must enter (infect) cells in order to ‘reproduce’. Some kill the cells they use to do this – others do not. If they are viruses that we have never met before, then they are more likely to be dangerous to us. Such a virus has recently been found present in 85 per cent of all cases of a cancer, mesothelioma, which is caused by asbestos. This virus, SV40, seemingly makes this toxin more dangerous to us, by switching off a human gene, p53, which protects us against cancer. And yet many exogenous viruses also do us no harm. We sometimes welcome them by making their genetic code part of our DNA. As such these harmless viruses are likely to have been around humanity for a long time. We have become adapted to each other.

Polio: are pesticides to blame?

Endocrinologist Morton Biskind said the spread of polio after WWII was caused by the ‘most intensive campaign of mass poisoning in human history’ – the spraying of some 3.1 billion pounds of pesticides.

The first epidemic of poliomyelitis in a tropical nation was contemporaneous with the introduction of the pesticide DDT in that country. Towards the end of WWII, US military camps in the Philippines started to be sprayed daily with DDT in order to kill flies.29 Writing in The Journal of the American Medical Association two years after the war, Albert Sabin reported that poliomyelitis became, after conflict, the major cause of death among the troops stationed at these camps. And yet unsprayed neighbouring populations were not affected by the disease.30 At the end of the war, the US military’s stocks of DDT were sold onto the public – despite the gravest warnings from establishment scientists.

In 1944, the US federal research centre the National Institutes of Health reported that DDT damaged the same part of the spinal cord (the anterior horn cells) that is damaged in infantile paralysis. Endocrinologist Dr Morton Biskind further described in 1949 how DDT caused ‘lesions in the spinal cord resembling those in human polio in animals’. He commented: ‘Despite the fact that DDT is a highly lethal poison for all species of animals, the myth has become prevalent among the general population that it is safe for man in virtually any quantity. Not only is it used in households with reckless abandon so that sprays and aerosols are inhaled, the solutions are permitted to contaminate skin, bedding and other textiles.’ The same year in Germany, Daniel Dresden found that acute DDT poisoning produced ‘degeneration in the central nervous system’ that seemed identical to that reported in severe cases of infantile paralysis. 31

Yet DDT was used to replace lead arsenate as a pesticide in fruit farming and with which to wash dairy cows. Heavy levels of DDT were soon reported in milk supplies. The organochlorine pesticide DDE (which is several times more dangerous than DDT) was also widely used in the US. Both were known to penetrate the blood-brain barrier that protects the human brain from viral invasion. Housewives were actually advised to spray DDT to stop infantile paralysis. Children’s bedrooms had wallpaper pre-soaked in DDT. Epidemics of infantile paralysis started to occur every year.

By 1952 the number of cases of infantile paralysis was three times higher than the figure for 1940.

Biskind treated over 200 patients affected with such neurological disorders. He found that many of these patients recovered when foods contaminated with pesticides were removed from their diets; this applied particularly to milk products. Biskind found high concentrations of DDT in butter purchased in New York. In 1949 he wrote: ‘Though it was originally observed in 1945 that DDT is absorbed through the skin, accumulates in the body fat and appears in the milk of animals, it has recently become almost universal practice to spray cattle with DDT… Although young animals are much more susceptible to the effects of DDT than adults, so far as the available literature is concerned, it does not appear that the effects of such concentrations on infants and children have even been considered.’ 32

Despite the official complacency about substances like DDT and DDE, a few doctors did consider the effects of toxins. Some reported successfully treating paralysed patients with dimercaprol, an anti-toxin that is still used in hospitals since it ‘binds’ heavy metal poisons such as arsenic and lead and renders them non-toxic. In 1951 Dr Irwin Eskwith reported successfully using dimercaprol to cure a child suffering from bulbar paralysis, the most severe form of infantile paralysis.33 A medical journal also reported that 17 acute cases of polio were cured after treatment with very large doses of another anti-toxin – ascorbic acid.34

 

 
Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Killing Middle America Legally while Robbing You Blind PDF Print E-mail

Source: OpEd News: Please visit and support  

May 19, 2008

By Bar Frank


In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported(1) that drug overdoses killed 33,000 people that year. Roughly 10,000 people died in 1990 of the same causes. In 1999, it was 20,000 people. Are you seeing the trend? In 2005, drug deaths were second only to car accidents (44,000 people killed) in the category of accidental deaths.

The category ''drug-induced causes'' includes not only deaths from dependent and nondependent use of either legal or illegal drugs, but also includes poisoning from medically prescribed and other drugs.


This huge increase in people dying is not because of a heroin or crack epidemic. It's not young black people who are dying either. This increase in deaths is happening in the middle-aged, white demographic. CDC epidemiologist Leonard Paulozzi stated to Congress, "Mortality statistics suggest that these deaths are largely due to the misuse and abuse of prescription drugs." (1a)

46% of of Americans(2) take at least one prescription pill daily. Do we really need this shit? Are these drugs really solving all of our problems? If so, why is the pharmaceutical industry growing every single year, with some of the biggest, if not the biggest, profit margins of any industry?

If you haven't seen the drug commercials, you are not watching TV. It used to be the majority of commercials were trying to get you to buy a car. That fact may still hold true, but these days you can't get through a set of commercials without being pitched the latest in Restless Leg Syndrome medication, or the best new pill to get you to sleep at night. Here's a tip: Stop being such a stressed out lard ass and get some exercise. Maybe your wife would screw you to sleep if you weren't so repulsive.

Get yourself a Tivo and skip the bullshit. I've never felt better!

How much is spent on marketing prescription drugs?
We all know about the commercials. But that only accounts for a portion of total spending for marketing pharmaceutical drugs. Big Pharma spends millions on commercial email, online marketing, and print. They will spend $1 billion in 2008 on direct marketing to make a return of $10 billion (3). Now that's profitable!

Despite my best efforts, I cannot find a comprehensive break-down of the total marketing spend of pharmaceutical companies. The best I can do is a study that shows that the, "pharmaceutical industry's drug promotion efforts ... estimate that the industry spent $12.7 billion promoting its products in 1998." (4)

The resulting estimate of $12.7 billion is high not only in absolute terms but in relative terms, Ma noted, as the pharmaceutical industry ranks 34th among the 200 U.S. industries with the largest advertising expenditures.


That was in 1998. The pharmaceutical industry has grown exponentially since then. The commercials have only gotten more rampant. And I thought drugs were so expensive because of Research and Development!

Shouldn't drugs sell themselves? Do you get the feeling that you're being sold these drugs to make you think that you're sick with something, just so you have to spend an insane amount of money per month on prescriptions? If those advertising numbers piss you off, then you might want to check out this article: Big Pharma Money Spent on Marketing Exceeds Drug Development Costs


Are these drugs we're swallowing by the pound effective?
Don't get me wrong. I am not some holistic health nut (although I'd probably live longer if I were). For the sake of disclosure, I do not take any prescriptions drugs. Am I lucky, or do I realize that most of our problems can be prevented or cured with changes to lifestyle?

I do see a place for drugs. Some people get legitimate help from the drugs the take. Some. A good portion of the drugs that make up the multi-billion dollar industry of pharmaceuticals are simply doing nothing, if not making us worse.

A recent study(5) suggests that anti-depressants only work for the severely depressed. If you're one of those halfway depressed souls, then you might as well be taking a sugar pill.

An analysis of the data showed that patients taking antidepressants fared no better than patients receiving a placebo. This appeared to be the case whether the patients were mildly or moderately depressed. The drugs only seemed to benefit a small group of patients -- those with the severest depression when the study began.



Middle-aged women: "Doctor, I'm depressed because I'm fat and I don't like myself."
Doc: "Here's some Paxil."
Pharmaceutical company: "CHA-CHING!"

Wake Up America!
Drug companies lie to you. Plain and simple. Those drugs you thought were non-habit forming? They are. Those drugs you thought could cure your Restless Leg Syndrome (which has got to be a made up disease), well, it causes compulsive gambling. Those drugs that cured arthritis? Well, turns out they cause heart attacks and the drug companies knew it.

The staggering death rate from accidental drug overdose or use is no accident. We're taking more drugs than we'll ever need. We're turning children into mindless drones because every time a kid jumps off the wall they're diagnosed with ADHD. (Maybe it was that 100 grams of sugar in their cereal they had in the morning?) Some will cause addiction and will ruin your life, like Percocet or Paxil. Others will simply eat up your income, producing absolutely no results except less money for you to spend on the things you need.

How about stopping the problems before they start? Get off your ass and live your life. Being overweight causes more problems than you can imagine and no pill is going to fix that. Working 16 hour days may bring in more money, but you're distancing yourself from your family. Don't be surprised when one of you has to get on anti-depressants, whether its you because of stress or your spouse because of depression and loneliness.

Take a step back and look at your life. Do you actually have problems, or do you only think you have problems because of what some commercial told you during Oprah?

Our bodies are incredibly well developed machines. Our brains are marvels of modern science. We can fix 95% of our problems because they are self-induced.

A follow-up article on this topic has been written: Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Marketing and Policy Making

Article Resources
1. CDC Report: Deaths for 2005.
1a. Alternet: Overdose Death Rate Surges, Legal Drugs Are Mostly to Blame
2. Healing Daily: Drug Companies
3. Marketing Charts: Pharmaceutical Sales to reach 10.6 billion in 2008
4. Stanford: STANFORD STUDY CALCULATES COST OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING EFFORTS
5. Forbes: Only Severely Depressed Benefit From Antidepressants: Study

 

Original article can also be found at Better Body Journal


 
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